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FINDING THE "ETERNAL AND UNREMITTING FORCE"' OF




In Wilson v. Sirmons, the Tenth Circuit was placed in a rare and
important position to address a question that has divided the federal cir-
cuits regarding the availability of habeas corpus relief for state prisoners.
Namely, the Tenth Circuit was to decide whether federal courts should
apply de novo review to the decisions of state courts when new evidence
in support of a constitutional claim was presented for the first time in
federal court . Put more precisely, the question was whether § 2254(d)
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies
to federal habeas corpus claims that rely on newly found evidence that
the state court did not consider when reaching its capital conviction.4 As
the abundance of litigation over the application of § 2254(d) indicates,
5
this is a question of paramount importance in the field of habeas corpus.
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit came to the correct de-
cision in limiting the scope of § 2254(d) and instead chose to apply de
novo review to these kinds of federal habeas appeals. In Parts I and II,
this Comment describes the history of habeas corpus, the background of
the AEDPA, and the Supreme Court precedent in interpreting § 2254(d).
Part III highlights the important precedent of de novo review that
hatched from the Tenth Circuit. Part IV briefly looks at how other Fed-
eral Circuit courts have split on the proper scope of § 2254(d). Finally,
Part V examines how federal courts have misapplied § 2254(d), and ar-
gues that federal courts should return to the procedural requirements of
granting a "full and fair" hearing for habeas appeals. Moreover, as a
matter of equity and statutory construction, this Comment argues that the
courts should follow the Tenth Circuit's Wilson decision and apply de
novo review when "new" evidence is presented in federal court.
I. BACKGROUND OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE AEDPA
Habeas corpus, a Latin phrase meaning "to have the body," is a writ
used to bring a person before the court when the legality of the person's
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) in ERIC M. FREEDMAN,
HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 159 n. 18 (2001).
2. 536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008).
3. Id. at 1073-74.
4. Id. at 1079.
5. See infra Part IV.
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imprisonment or detention is at issue.6 Habeas corpus is better known as
"the Great Writ," because, as Blackstone famously stated, it is "the most
celebrated writ in the English law" and remains "the stable bulwark of
our liberties."7 Celebrated as it may be, the "Great Writ" has been great-
ly curtailed in recent years.
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pe-
nalty Act,8 which codified many of the limitations set forth by the Su-
preme Court,9 while imposing a series of new and unprecedented limita-
tions on the writ.'0  One change of particular importance was to
§ 2254(d), which established a new standard of review for federal courts
to apply to state court decisions." Under § 2254(d), federal courts are
barred from granting habeas claims that were "adjudicated on the merits"
in state courts unless: (1) the decision was contrary to, or was an unrea-
sonable application of, "clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court;" or (2) the decision resulted in an "unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding."'
12
Accordingly, one of the major issues of § 2254(d) after the enact-
ment of the AEDPA was determining how deferential federal courts
ought to be to state court decisions. For starters, many commentators
question the very the idea that § 2254(d) establishes a standard of review,
arguing instead that § 2254(d) is better understood as a limitation on re-
lief.13 Moreover, the provisions within § 2254(d) remain intensely de-
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). in addition to issues of imprisonment,
habeas corpus is also used as a way to ask the court to review (1) the regularity of the extradition
process, (2) the right to or the amount of bail, or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has imposed a
criminal sentence. Id.
7. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
8. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
9. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 381,
415 (1996) ("There is no denying that § 2254(d) captures something like the descriptions of 'new'
rules that appear in the Teague cases."); Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 501, 530-35 (2008) (pointing out that Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), further ex-
panded the amount of deference the Supreme Court was willing to give state courts-and legisla-
tures-in deciding what proportional punishment is).
10. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REv.
443, 506 (2007) (observing that the AEDPA went beyond the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to codify
jurisdiction limitations to: (1) most successive federal petitions, (2) most unexhaustive claims that
are deemed frivolous, and (3) any claim filed outside of the one year statute of limitations).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
12. Id.; See also Justin Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA
§ 2254(D)(2) and (E)(1), 82 TUL. L. REv. 385, 405 (2007) (explaining that § 2254(d) is a limit on,
and not a condition for, habeas relief).
13. See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REv. 259,
284 (2006) (characterizing the majority of habeas corpus cases as governed by the AEDPA and
"§ 2254(d)'s limitation on relief provision."); Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in the Federal
Habeas Corpus Fog: Determining What Constitutes "clearly established law" under the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 747, 749 n.9 (2005) (agreeing with
the limitation on relief interpretation, and citing JAMES S. LIEEMAN & RANDY HERTZ, 2 FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32.1, at 1419-21 (4th ed. 2001)); id at 1421
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bated. Primarily, the meaning of the phrases "contrary to" and "unrea-
sonable application of' under § 2254(d)(1) have been the subject of vari-
ous law review articles.' 4 As for § 2254(d)(2), commentators have de-
bated what is actually required for "an unreasonable determination of the
facts" to occur.
15
In recent decades, much of the § 2254(d) puzzle has been addressed
in a patchwork of Supreme Court decisions; there remains, however, a
critical gap in the jurisprudence. Specifically, § 2254(d)(1) fails to pro-
vide an adequate way to resolve federal habeas claims that proffer entire-
ly new, potentially exculpatory, evidence on appeal. New exculpatory
evidence does not fit neatly into the § 2254(d)(1) framework because it is
not clear whether the claim was ever actually "adjudicated on the merits"
without the newly obtained evidence. That is to say, § 2254(d)(1) only
applies to claims "adjudicated on the merits," and when a federal court
has new evidence, there are significant reasons to doubt whether the
claim adjudicated in federal court is really the same as the claim adjudi-
cated in state court. Accordingly, when there is significant new evidence
that comes up on appeal, including mitigating evidence that might have
had a direct impact on the sentencing on the defendant, it is entirely un-
clear whether § 2254(d)(1) even applies. In accordance with the Tenth
Circuit decision in Wilson, this Comment argues that when this kind of
situation arises, the only option available to addressing such habeas
claims is de novo review of the state court decision.
II. THE EXISTING § 2254(d) FRAMEWORK
A. Williams v. Taylor
Williams v. Taylor was the first Supreme Court case to interpret
§ 2254(d) after the enactment of the AEDPA.16 In Williams, the Court
produced two controlling opinions, one by Justice O'Connor and the
other by Justice Stevens. 17 In the O'Connor opinion, the Court held that
under § 2254(d)(1) a state court decision is "contrary to" federal law
when (1) the state court applies a rule that "contradicts the governing law
set forth in our cases,"'18 or (2) the state court decision "confronts a set of
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court
("[S]ection 2254(d)(1) operates as a 'constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant...
the writ .. " (first omission in original)(quoting Williams, infra note 33)); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.1, at 862 (4th ed. 2003) ("Technically, federal court consideration of
the habeas corpus petition is not considered a direct review of the state court decision: rather, the
petition constitutes a separate civil suit filed in federal court and is termed collateral relief.")).
14. See Berry, supra note 13, at 749 n.12 (providing an extensive list of law review articles
written on § 2254(d)(1)).
15. See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 12, at 385 (discussing the deference owed to state findings
of fact); John K. Chapman, Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Cor-
pus Under the New 28 U.S.C. §2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1874-76 (1997).
16. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
17. Id. at 367, 399.
18. Id. at 405.
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and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." 9 As
for the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the O'Connor
opinion concluded that a state court's decision is unreasonable only if it
"correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably
to the facts of a particular case.",20 Thus, the O'Connor opinion declared
that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an in-
correct application of federal law,' 2' thereby advancing a more deferen-
tial standard of review to state court decisions.22
Although the Court produced two controlling opinions by both
O'Connor and Stevens, O'Connor's opinion defining the "contrary to"
and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) garnered the ma-
jority vote. And, according to one commentator, the O'Connor opinion
was principally important for beginning to establish which standard of
review is required under § 2254(d).23 Williams signified a departure
from Brown v. Allen 24 and the so-called "Golden Era" of habeas, with
federal courts now having to defer to state court decisions even when
federal courts might have reached a different conclusion. 5 In other
words, "[e]ven if the state court ruling is incorrect-that is, even if a
federal court exercising independent judgment would reach a different
conclusion-federal habeas relief is available only if the state court's
application of established Supreme Court law is unreasonable." 26 Thus,
it was the legacy of O'Connor's opinion, rather than Stevens's, that con-
trolled the analytical framework of § 2254(d) for future cases. After
Williams, then, it was clear that if § 2254(d)(1) applied, relief was not
available unless the state court's adjudication was unreasonable or con-
trary to clearly established federal law.
B. Lockyer v. Andrade
In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Supreme Court further clarified how se-
27vere the limitations implied by § 2254(d)(1) actually were. In Lockyer,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by applying § 2254(d)(1) to the sen-
tencing of a repeat offender. 8 For the "unreasonable application" clause
of § 2254(d)(1), the Court concluded that the standards of "clear error"
and "unreasonableness" are different because the "gloss of clear error
19. Id. at 406.
20. Id. at 407-08.
21. Id. at 410 (emphasis in original).
22. Id. at 411 ("[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly estab-
lished federal law erroneously or incorrectly.").
23. Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How
Should AEDPA 's Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 WIs. L. REv. 1493,
1507 (2001).
24. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
28. Id. at 71.
1182 [Vol. 86:3
WILSON V. SIRMONS
fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even
clear error) with unreasonableness. 29 In other words, unreasonableness
was a more deferential, higher standard to reach for the purposes of §
2254(d)(1). The Court thus defined the unreasonableness standard as
when a state court decisions rested on an application of federal law so
"erroneously or incorrectly" that the application itself is "objectively
unreasonable. 3 °
Lockyer's definition of "objective" reasonableness underscores the
importance of determining when § 2254(d)(1) applies. As one commen-
tator lamented, after Lockyer, § 2254(d)(1) appears to narrow the quali-
fied immunity framework in civil suit actions for damages under
§ 1983. 3' In effect, this would allow state judges greater protection in
determining federal claims in state courts the same way that "the law of
qualified immunity shield[s] executive officers administering state poli-
cies in the field.",32 Thus, Lockyer reflects the Court's willingness to
impose extraordinary deference on federal habeas courts in reviewing
state court decisions. Lockyer does not, however, nor has any Supreme
Court decision for that matter, define the necessary conditions for the
application of § 2254(d)(1).
Accordingly, at present lower courts are left in something of a bind.
After Williams and Lockyer, two fundamental messages emerged: (1) the
unreasonableness clause of § 2254(d)(1) was intended to establish sub-
stantial deference to state court decisions that were adjudicated on the
merits; but, on the other hand, (2) no clear guidelines were provided as to
when § 2254(d)(1) actually applied. 33 The Tenth Circuit's Wilson deci-
sion does much to resolve this dilemma.
1I. DE Novo REVIEW FROM THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In light of both the severity and lack of clarity in applying
§ 2254(d)(1), the Tenth Circuit recognized the procedural due process
issues inherent in deferring to a state court decision that ignored new
extrinsic evidence made available on appeal.34 To address this problem,
the Tenth Circuit adopted de novo review in certain instances when new
evidence is admitted in federal court.35 By applying de novo review to
federal habeas appeals that involve new extrinsic evidence, the Tenth
Circuit avoids the pitfalls of due process that were involved with other
29. Id. at 75.
30. Id. at 76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411).
31. Yackle, supra note 9, at 403-04.
32. Id. at 404.
33. Steinman, supra note 24, at 1509-10.
34. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1082-83 (10th Cir. 2008).
35. Id. at 1079.
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courts straining to apply § 2254(d)(1) to these claims. 36 Below are the
recent seminal cases that have established this precedent.
A. Bryan v. Mullin: The Beginning of De Novo Review from the Tenth
Circuit
Robert Bryan was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
death in Oklahoma state court.37 During a jury trial addressing the ques-
tion of Bryan's competency, his counsel did not present any medical
testimony. 38 Even after Bryan had replaced his original counsel, his sub-
sequent counsel had also failed to present any mental health evidence
during the guilt and penalty phase of the trial.39 On appeal to the Okla-
homa Criminal Court of Appeals, Bryan claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel for the guilt and penalty phase of his trial because counsel failed
to present mitigating evidence of Bryan's mental illness.4° Although the
appeal was rejected, the Tenth Circuit granted rehearing en banc to de-
termine whether failing to present mental health evidence at trial com-
ports with the Constitution, and whether relief is available under the
AEDPA.41
The Tenth Circuit held that Bryan was entitled to a hearing because
such legal issues were outside the scope of § 2254(d).42 More precisely,
the Tenth Circuit found that the court erred in applying the deferential
review standards set out in § 2254(d) in reviewing Bryan's claims that
his trial counsel was ineffective.43 The Tenth Circuit ruled that de novo
36. Compare Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying de novo
review when a defendant is diligent in pursuing a new non-record claim, and the state court does not
consider the non-record evidence in affirming a sentence or denying an evidentiary hearing), and
Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying de novo review when the
reason for denying a hearing is not rebutted by the four factor test of unreasonableness under §
2254(d)(2)), with Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying deference to
claims where "new evidence is presented on federal habeas review," and distinguishing the Ninth
Circuit precedent as only applying to perjury caused by a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence), and Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 953 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to follow Tenth
Circuit de novo precedent because the Tenth Circuit was incorrectly applying pre-AEDPA rationale
to present cases).
37. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1213.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1214.
42. See id. at 1215. Instead of analyzing Bryan's claim under § 2254(d), the Tenth Circuit
began evaluating the issue under § 2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA. Id. Section 2254(e)(2) provides that
"[ilf the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the
court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant" satisfies the exceptions
listed under § 2254(e)(2)(A) or (B). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006). However, if the applicant did
not fail to develop the factual basis for his claim in state court, § 2254(e)(2) is not applicable, and "a
federal habeas court should proceed to analyze whether a hearing is appropriate or required under
pre-AEDPA standards." Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1214 (citing Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253
(10th Cir. 1998)). The Tenth Circuit found that, "[b]ecause Bryan diligently sought to 'develop the
factual basis of [his] claim in State court proceedings,' § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary
hearing." Id. at 1215 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)).
43. Id. at 1216 n.7.
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was the proper standard of review for Bryan's appeal because his inef-
fective assistance claim involved mixed questions of law and fact.4
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit noted that, because the state court did not
hold an evidentiary hearing in reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit
was in the same position as the state court to evaluate the same factual
record.45 Thus, "to the extent the state court's dismissal of [Bryan's inef-
fective assistance claim] was based on its own factual findings, we need
not afford those findings any deference." 46 The court concluded that
counsel's choice in not presenting Bryan's mental health evidence during
the guilt and penalty phase was not "objectively unreasonable" because
counsel-and the court-believed presenting such testimony might ulti-
mately do more harm than good for Bryan's case.
Through Bryan, the Tenth Circuit greatly refined how federal ha-
beas courts may address the issue of hearing new evidence made availa-
ble on appeal. Specifically, Bryan left a lasting impression on how to
approach newfound mitigating evidence on a federal habeas appeal that
would otherwise avoid having to force the courts to apply § 2254(d)(1)
under such circumstances. As a result, in recognizing that Bryan was
entitled to a full and fair hearing, the Tenth Circuit avoided the procedur-
al due process issues of denying individuals a meaningful opportunity to
develop new and significant claims.48 Thus, the Tenth Circuit set the de
novo standard for addressing these types of federal habeas claims.
B. Wilson v. Sirmons: The Tenth Circuit Solidifies De Novo Review
In Wilson, the Tenth Circuit held that de novo review is required
when new evidence is admitted at the federal level.49 As noted by the
Tenth Circuit in Wilson, Federal Circuits differ in determining whether a
claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" when, on appeal, there is
some indication that the exclusion of significant evidence led to a pre-
judicial state court decision. 50 To this controversy, the Tenth Circuit
applied de novo review because, according to Wilson, § 2254(d) defe-
rence does not apply to state court decisions that lack an evidentiary
hearing or, for that matter, to "any factual determinations made without
reference to the proffered evidence.' In other words, if the state court
makes no reference to, or provides no procedures for, ensuring that sig-
nificant mitigating evidence is part of its decision, then the claim was not
44. Id. 1215-16 (citing Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1224.
48. Marceau, supra note 12, at 418 n.173.
49. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008).
50. Id. at 1082 n.3.
51. Id. at 1082 (emphasis added).
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"adjudicated on the merits" and § 2254(d) deference does not apply be-
cause the defendant was never given a proper full and fair hearing.
52
Wilson involved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on feder-
al habeas appeal from the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals. 53 Mi-
chael Wilson, sentenced to death for first degree murder and robbery
with a deadly weapon, argued that his capital conviction was unconstitu-
tional because his attorney failed to adequately prepare a medical expert
to testify to Wilson's mental health problems during the sentencing phase
of his trial.54 Although the medical expert performed tests prior to trial
that confirmed Wilson had suffered from various mental disorders (in-
cluding anxiety, bipolar, and post traumatic stress), during the direct ex-
amination of the medical expert Wilson's counsel failed to ask about the
specific results from Wilson's psychiatric testing.55 By not having the
jury hear the results of the test, Wilson argued, the state court's decision
to sentence him to death was "constitutionally deficient.,
56
In Wilson, the Tenth Circuit provided a comprehensive exegesis re-
garding when § 2254(d)(1) applies.57 Under § 2254(d)(1), the court
found that a state court decision is contrary to clearly established law "if
the state court applied a rule differently from the governing law set forth
in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Su-
preme Court] has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. 58
The court also found that an unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished federal law occurs when "the state court identifies the correct go-
verning legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decision but unrea-
sonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case. 59
The Tenth Circuit uniquely drew on the import of "new evidence"
to alter how certain habeas claims might be adjudicated.60 Rather than
applying § 2254(d)(1), the Tenth Circuit endorsed a more precise appli-
cation of de novo review to those habeas claims with new non-record
evidence, which were previously denied an evidentiary hearing in state
court. When a defendant is diligent in pursuing a new non-record
claim, and the state court did not consider the non-record evidence in
affirming a sentence or denying an evidentiary hearing, the Tenth Circuit
52. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 424-37 (recounting the legislative history of § 2254 and
positing that the non-deferential standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit is in accord with legislative
intention).
53. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1070.
54. Id. at 1072, 1074.
55. Id. at 1075-76.
56. Id. at 1077.
57. Id. at 1073-74.
58. Id. (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)).
59. Id. at 1073 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)).




held that de novo review governs such habeas claims. 62 Accordingly,
when a federal habeas claim provides new, significant evidence made
available on appeal, and the evidence has not been previously adjudi-
cated, then § 2254(d)(1) simply does not apply.
The Tenth Circuit was quick to note that there were limits to what
type of new evidence calls for de novo review outside of the confines of
§ 2254(d) deference. The court reasoned that "[h]ad the state court eva-
luated the non-record evidence in its denial of Mr. Wilson's Strickland
claim and his request for an evidentiary hearing, we would apply
AEDPA's deferential standard. 63 Thus, it seems that a primary compo-
nent as to why de novo applied in Wilson stems primarily from the fact
that the state court simply failed to examine proffered non-record evi-
dence. As the Tenth Circuit stated, "the OCCA in this case, by contrast
[to other state courts], made clear that it was relying solely on the trial
record, and not the non-record evidence, when it denied the claim and the
evidentiary hearing. ' 64 Because the state court refused to make factual
findings on the evidence, let alone have an evidentiary hearing on the
matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that it had "no choice but to review
both legal and factual findings de novo."
65
Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the state court's
decision to not fully develop the facts through an evidentiary hearing-as
well as the lack of procedural fairness in deferring to the state court deci-
sion without the proffered evidence-to reach de novo review in Wil-
son.66 The Tenth Circuit held that "[b]ecause Mr. Wilson's allegations,
if true and fully developed, would entitle him to relief, we reverse the
district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on this claim. '67 Addi-
tionally, throughout the opinion the Tenth Circuit evaluated the case
based on whether Mr. Bryan was given a "fundamentally unfair" hearing
in state court.68 Thus, the two factors of developing a full record and
conducting fair hearings seemed tantamount to the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion in Wilson.
69
Having described when § 2254(d) deference does not apply, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the state court decision de novo.70 Beginning its
analysis, the Tenth Circuit noted the following:
[I]t is well established in this Circuit that when a state court's dispo-
sition of a mixed question of law and fact, including a claim of inef-
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 472 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
65. Id. at 1081.
66. See id. at 1083.
67. Id. at 1074 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 1102, 1112,1114.
69. See id. at 1081.
70. Id. at 1079.
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fective assistance, is based on an incomplete factual record, through
no fault of the defendant, and the complete factual record has since
been developed and is before this Court, we apply de novo review to
our evaluation of the underlying claim.
71
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that when a state court makes a decision
based on an incomplete factual record, those factual findings are given
no deference.72 Because the district court effectively ignored Bryan's
affidavits providing evidence of his emotional and mental problems, the
Tenth Circuit held that it had "no choice" but to review both the legal
and factual findings de novo.7 3
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit found de novo review by noting that
the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to address the exact same issue
in its upcoming 2008-2009 tenn.74 Although the case would later be
dismissed as improvidently granted,75 the Supreme Court nonetheless
initially granted certiorari to determine whether § 2254(d) deference ap-
plies to claims "predicated on evidence of prejudice" in a state court's
refusal to consider new and significant evidence.76 Recognizing that
Wilson involved the exact same issue, the Tenth Circuit's decision was a
call of action in many ways, with the court concluding that there is a
"need. for de novo review" when federal habeas claims involve evidence
that has not been adjudicated with a full and fair hearing.77 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit's decision was made with at least some consideration that
the Supreme Court will inevitably have to wrestle with the very same
issue.
Therefore, Wilson was a turning point not only for appropriately li-
miting the scope of § 2254(d)(1), but also for providing a more exacting
framework for when de novo review ought to apply. According to the
Tenth Circuit, de novo review is limited to those rare instances when a
full and fair evidentiary hearing has been denied such that new and sig-
nificant evidence would be unfairly excluded from deciding the merits of
the habeas claim.78 The Tenth Circuit concluded that when a district
could has not held an evidentiary hearing or made any factual findings
based on the new non-record evidence federal courts have "no choice but
to review both legal and factual findings de novo., 79 As such, de novo
71. Id. (citing Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Miller v.
Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998)).
72. Id. (quoting Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254).
73. Id. at 1081.
74. Id. at 1082 n. 3.
75. 129 S. Ct. 393 (2008) (mem.) (per curiam).
76. Bell, 128 S. Ct. 2108 (mem.) (granting certiorari as to Question 1 presented in petition);
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Bell v. Kelly, 129 S. Ct. 393 (2008) (mem.) (per curiam) (No.
07-1223).
77. Wilson, 536 F.3d 1079.
78. Id. at 1079-81.
79. Id. at 1081.
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review is applied as a last resort; but, as the Tenth Circuit implied, it is a
necessary last resort when the defendant was never given a full and fair
hearing to adjudicate claims that implicate new and significant evi-
dence. 8° Thus, the Tenth Circuit solidified an appropriate, albeit narrow,
place for de novo review in federal habeas proceedings.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS SPLIT: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER
§ 2254(d)
Although the Tenth Circuit has required de novo review of state
court decisions that failed to examine non-record evidence for claims
involving significant due process issues, other circuits have not. Of the
five other circuits to have addressed the issue, four have reached the op-
posite conclusion from the Tenth Circuit. For example, the Fifth Circuit
explicitly declined to follow the Tenth Circuit de novo precedent be-
cause, according to the court, the Tenth Circuit was incorrectly applying
pre-AEDPA rationale to present cases.81 Instead, the Fifth Circuit held
that a "full and fair hearing" was not a precondition for applying
§ 2254(d) standard of review.8 2 The Sixth Circuit also applied § 2254(d)
deference to claims where "new evidence [was] presented on federal
habeas review," and distinguished the Ninth Circuit precedent as only
applying to perjury caused by a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpa-
tory evidence.8 3 The Seventh Circuit also implemented § 2254(d) defe-
rence to state court decisions having evidentiary issues on appeal.84 The
Seventh Circuit noted that, although an evidentiary hearing can "bear on
the reasonableness of the state courts' adjudication," the court simply did
not see why "it should alter the standard of federal review.,8 5
Recently, the Fourth Circuit held in the case of Bell v. Kelly86 that a
defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to present mitigat-
ing evidence, upholding the lower court decision as "reasonable" under
§ 2254(d). 7 In reaching the decision, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the
habeas appeal to determine "not whether the state court's determination
was incorrect but whether the determination was unreasonable-a sub-
stantially higher threshold. ' 88 In other words, the Fourth Circuit found
substantial deference under § 2254(d)(1) to uphold a district court con-
89viction.
80. Id. at 1079-81.
81. Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941,953 (5th Cir. 2001).
82. Id. at 951.
83. Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2005).
84. See, e.g., Matheney v. Anderson, 377 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir. 2004); Pecoraro v. Walls,
286 F.3d 439,443 (7th Cir. 2002).
85. Pecoraro, 286 F.3d at 443 (emphasis in original).
86. 260 Fed. App'x 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2008).
87. Id. at 607.
88. Id. at 605 (quoting Schiro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2007)).
89. Id. at 605; but see id. at 604 ("We review a district court's decision to grant or deny ha-
beas relief de novo.").
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Fourth Circuit was correct in applying § 2254(d) deference when the
decision was "in conflict with decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits."90 Although Bell v. Kelly was ultimately dismissed as improvi-
dently granted,9' the Supreme Court is still looking for an opportunity to
address this circuit split. In particular, another case this term, Cone v.
Bell,92 had the Court again raising the possibility that the reach of
§ 2254(d)(1) might not be as broad as many circuits believe.
93
V. FOLLOWING THE TENTH CIRCUIT' S LEAD IN APPLYING DE Novo
REVIEW
In the twelve years since the enactment of the AEDPA, a troubling
trend has emerged. Namely, there seems to be a fundamental misunders-
tanding as to when deference is owed to state court decisions. Perverse-
ly, federal courts have rejected habeas claims that bring to light impor-
tant prejudicial evidence that was excluded from otherwise reasonable
state court decisions.
The Wilson decision has changed all that. By emphasizing the fac-
tors of procedural fairness and the state courts' development of a full
factual record, the Tenth Circuit leads the circuit courts in determining
when "new evidence" is sufficient to require de novo review. As the
Tenth Circuit held, if the allegations in Wilson were true and fully devel-
oped, then the state court decision was never "adjudicated on the merits,"
and the defendant was therefore denied a proper full and fair hearing on
the claim.94 Thus, the federal courts should follow the Tenth Circuit's
lead in recognizing that § 2254(d) simply does not apply to claims that
had never been "adjudicated on the merits" in state court.
Historically, this was exactly how § 2254(d) was viewed. Prior to
the AEDPA, § 2254(d) provided that any proceeding instituted in a fed-
eral court by an application of writ of habeas "shall be presumed to be
correct" unless "the factfinding procedure employed by the State court
was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing. 95 This "full and fair"
requirement is derived from Professor Bator's seminal law review article,
which argued that the only instance where a federal habeas court has
jurisdiction to review a state court's final decision is when the state court
90. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. Kelly, 2008 WL 819276, *1 (Mar. 26, 2008)
(requesting the Supreme Court whether "the Fourth Circuit err[ed] when, in conflict with decisions
of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, it applied the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which is
reserved for claims "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, to evaluate a claim predicated on
evidence of prejudice the state court refused to consider and that was properly received for the first
time in a federal evidentiary hearingT').
91. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 393.
92. 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).
93. Id. ('The question presented is whether petitioner is entitled to federal habeas review of
his claim that the State suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland . .
94. Wilson v. Sirmons, 563 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2008).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1994).
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failed to "furnish a criminal defendant with a full and fair opportunity to
make his case and litigate his case. 96
Interestingly, the "full and fair" language was omitted from the
AEDPA version of § 2254(d).97 Some commentators have argued that
this omission was not a rejection of this procedural rule.98 Rather, it
seems nearly self-evident that state courts would still be expected to have
adequate, full, and fair procedures in place to satisfy the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.99 The question, then, is why was the
"full and fair" language omitted from the AEDPA version of § 2254(d)?
The answer, according to at least one commentator, was that Congress
wanted to avoid linking the AEDPA to Bator's model of federal habeas
reform. 1°° Looking at the Congressional debates, "full and fair" became
a pejorative phrase to describe far-reaching habeas reform involving
complete deference to state court findings.' 0 ' Congress omitted the
phrase to instead include an "unreasonable application" clause in
§ 2254(d)(2) to define what procedural standard was required for state
court decisions. 10 2 Although this change in phrase is undeniably opera-
tive, it is important to note that the change was made because the phrases
"full and fair" and "unreasonable application" were viewed as redun-
dant.10 3 Thus, although the "full and fair" language was dropped from
the AEDPA, the omission may have involved political semantics rather
than a substantive change in Congressional intent.
As such, federal courts should still apply the procedural require-
ments of a "full and fair" hearing to federal habeas claims. At a mini-
mum, the absence of a full and fair hearing in the state court is itself a
relevant violation of due process.' °4 Thus, at a bare minimum, a "full
and fair" hearing is required for the state court to have properly adjudi-
cated the merits of the case. As the Tenth Circuit made clear, if a defen-
dant tries to develop facts for his claim that were excluded from a state
court decision, then the AEDPA is not applicable and "a federal habeas
court should proceed to analyze whether a hearing is appropriate or re-
96. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441,456 (1963).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
98. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 425-26; Yackle, supra note 9, at 381 ("On the whole [the
AEDPA] presupposes the basic framework already in place.... [Tihe new statute takes the preex-
isting habeas landscape as its baseline.").
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. Marceau, supra note 12, at 430.
101. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 9, at 428; S. Rep. No. 98-226, at 24-27 (1983); 137 Cong.
Rec. H8001 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Fish) (noting that the attempts to redefine
"full and fair" do not adequately address his concern that the reform will have the effect of stripping
federal courts' power to review the merits of state habeas decisions).
102. See Kovarsky, supra note 10, at 506.
103. Id.
104. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,299 (1992).
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quired under pre-AEDPA standards."10 5 Thus, when a state court lacks
some extrinsic and substantive evidence to make a decision, the AEDPA
simply does not apply, and, therefore, de novo review is proper.
Additionally, a "full and fair" hearing is the most proper way to en-
sure that state court decisions are adjudicated on the merits. Granted, the
wording of the AEDPA is unequivocal in limiting federal courts from
granting habeas to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits."'0
6
Nevertheless, if a state court decision was made without a full and fair
hearing, then the decision could not be-by sheer definition-properly
adjudicated on the merits. Consequently, as the Tenth Circuit correctly
found in Wilson, when a state court makes a decision based on an incom-
plete factual record, those factual findings afford no deference on federal
habeas appeal.107 Therefore, although the AEDPA was meant to general-
ly limit federal habeas appeals, this limitation was not meant for cases
that failed to have a "full and fair" hearing in state court.
Having stated that, it is important to note that federal courts may
still have federalism concerns for applying de novo review. The AEDPA
emerged from an era when Congress feared that state court decisions
were not given proper deference in reaching judicial finality.'0 8 For ex-
ample, one of the most significant arguments for habeas reform came
from Professor Bator, who recognized that finality in criminal law is
generally avoided until "we are somehow truly satisfied that justice has
been done."' 9 His point was that no judicial process can assure ultimate
truth, but a justice system can provide some finality in the process to gain
greater trust and confidence in the system.110 Professor Bator according-
ly argued that the greatest mistake courts can make is to second guess
decisions "merely for the sake of second-guessing, in the service of the
illusory notion that if we only try hard enough we will find the
'truth."""' By allowing courts to continually second-guess other courts,
the justice system risks creating greater disagreement and unease about
the criminal law system.'
12
105. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miller v. Champion, 161
F.3d 1249, 1253 (1Oth Cir. 1998)).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996) (emphasis added).
107. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller, 161 F.3d at
1254).
108. Yackle, supra note 9, at 436 n.181 ("[If] we do not reform Federal habeas corpus review
of State cases, then we will have the same incessant, frivolous appeals ad hominem [sic], day and
night, from that point on because this amendment would not take care of that problem. If we are
going to pass habeas reform, let us pass real habeas reform .... Let us protect civil liberties, but let
us get some finality into the law so that the frivolous appeal game will be over.").
109. Bator, supra note 96, at 441.
110. Id. at 452.
Ill. Id. at 451.
112. Id. at 443.
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As such, these concerns played a fundamental role in shaping the
policy decisions behind the AEDPA. 113 Though Congress was adamant
about rejecting Bator's phrase "full and fair" into the provisions of
§ 2254(d)," 4 Congress was nonetheless in agreement with Bator in desir-
ing further limitations in which habeas appeals could be heard at the fed-
eral level.1 5 The AEDPA was meant to correct deficiencies that mem-
bers of Congress saw in the federal habeas appeal process, including
"frivolous" lawsuits clogging up the criminal courts.11 6 More broadly,
the AEDPA was intended to grant state courts greater deference, as a
matter of comity and federalism.' 
1 7
Yet, these policies of finality, comity, and federalism have led to the
creation of a higher standard of unreasonableness rather than addressing
state court decisions involving an incorrect error. As the Supreme Court
duly noted, "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from
an incorrect application of federal law."' 18 An unreasonable application
standard under § 2254(d)(1) permits state courts to err above and beyond
an incorrect application of the law. And, in turn, federal habeas courts
"may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its inde-
pendent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly."' 9 Thus, the prin-
ciples of finality, comity, and federalism are already captured in the §
2254(d)(1) provision, but only to those claims that have been adjudicated
on the merits.
As a result, federal courts can address these federalism concerns by
providing a clearer standard on what an unreasonable application of fed-
eral law entails. As provided by the Tenth Circuit in Wilson, "while fe-
deralism, comity, and finality ... are undoubtedly important values, the
importance of these values is reduced when a claim has never been con-
sidered on the merits. ' 2°  Accordingly, de novo review is a drastic
measure, but it is a necessary one when the state court fails to hold an
evidentiary hearing or make factual findings on new significant evidence.
Thus, nearly the only time when new evidence requires federal courts to
apply de novo review is when, as the Tenth Circuit found in Wilson, the
federal court has "no choice but to review both legal and factual findings
de novo."' 121 In other words, by following the analysis of the Wilson de-
113. Cf. Marceau, supra note 12, at 429-30 (noting that Bator's approach was the model ex-
pressly and repeatedly rejected by Congress).
114. Id.
115. Yackle, supra note 9, at 388.
116. Id. at 398.
117. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,436 (2000).
118. Id. at 410 (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at411.
120. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1083 (10th Cir. 2008).
121. Id. at 1081.
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cision, federalism is still upheld so long as the state court has demon-
strated a full and fair examination of the facts in reaching its decision.
Finally, it is important to note that de novo review encourages fed-
eral courts to return to the duty of deciding matters of law. There has
been a general tendency by the federal courts-including the Supreme
Court-to use § 2254(d) as a way to avoid having to address significant
constitutional issues. 22 Habeas corpus is the Great Writ because it uni-
quely requires courts to address some of most fundamental issues of con-
stitutional law in the context of criminal procedure. This includes the
possibility of a person being sentenced to death because of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a concealment of exculpatory evidence, or even a
confession that is obtained by artifice or force. 123 Federal habeas courts
must address these issues head on, rather than hide behind a mischaracte-
rization of "§ 2254(d) deference."
For example, the Supreme Court has seemingly hidden behind
§ 2254(d) deference to sidestep making important decisions on whether
(1) the Eighth Amendment limits the states' three strikes policies for
applying harsher punishments, 124 (2) the Fourteenth Amendment limits
the potentially prejudicial effects of spectators wearing buttons depicting
the image of the murder victim during trial, 125 and (3) the Sixth Amend-
ment renders an ineffective assistance of counsel claim successful when
the lawyer participates in a first-degree murder plea hearing by phone.
126
Consistently, the Supreme Court punts on these constitutional issues be-
cause its previous decisions "give no clear answer to the question pre-
sented, let alone one in [the habeas peitioner's] favor," and therefore "it
cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly estab-
lished Federal law."",
127
Although the proponents for habeas reform might call for federal
courts to avoid making decisions on these controversial constitutional
issues, it might be that this restraint is the very reason for why federal
habeas appeals still creates significant problems for procedural due
process. The most important constitutional rights in criminal procedure
sprang from the writ of habeas corpus, including the right to counsel for
indigents, 12 8 the incorporation of the rights to due process and protection
from self incrimination in state court proceedings, 129 and a constitutional
122. See "Clearly Established Law" in Habeas Review, 121 HARv. L. REv. 335, 336 (2007)
(noting that the Supreme Court used the AEDPA to "neatly sidestep" substantive constitutional law
issues and instead provide deference to state-court decisions without offering "a coherent justifica-
tion for its deference.").
123. ANDREA D. LYON Er AL., FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus xiv (2005).
124. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76-77 (2003).
125. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).
126. Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743,746-47 (2008).
127. Id. at 747 (quoting Carey, 549 U.S. at 76-77 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
128. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
129. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
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standard for when a defendant is receiving ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.130 This history has been compromised by Congress wanting to evade
these difficult issues by placing the weight of such decision in state
courts.
The net effect has been rather destructive for the justice system. By
abusing § 2254(d) as a shield from making decisions, federal courts have
created a checkerboard of constitutional rights where each state defines
fundamental rights in criminal procedure differently. 31  As Alexander
Hamilton portended, the consequence of this is that state courts will be
unlikely to "give full scope" to federal rights that are "unpopular local-
ly. ' 32 In other words, fundamental rights protected by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause are compromised because each state might define the rights
in competing, if not entirely different, ways. Thus, it is little wonder
why the extreme misuse of deference under § 2254(d) has created great
confusion for habeas claims. Many federal courts simply do not want to
address the difficult legal questions that attach to writs of habeas corpus,
and therefore defer to state courts to decide.
Federal courts must return to using the Great Writ as a vehicle for
addressing major constitutional issues that arise in criminal procedure,
and federal courts should adopt de novo review to ensure procedural
fairness. In the famous words of Justice Marshall, it is the "province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' ' 133 Constitutional
rights are not meant to be fossilized under § 2254(d); rather, federal
courts should play an active role in deciding the merits of those rare ha-
beas claims that offer significant new evidence that may bring to light
other substantive constitutional issues. As the Tenth Circuit ruled, if a
state court decision was made without an evidentiary hearing, where the
procedural requirements of a full and fair hearing is denied,' 34 the federal
court should apply de novo review to evaluate the underlying claim.
135
Thus, in those rare instances when state courts do not have enough fac-
tual information or legal precedent to make a decision, or in those even
rarer cases like Wilson where the state court refuses to consider even
having a full and fair evidentiary hearing to address the claim,136 federal
courts should apply de novo review. By applying de novo review in such
rare circumstances, federal courts are given a better opportunity to ad-
130. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
131. Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 316-17 (1982).
132. Justin F. Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights: The Tension between the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modem Criminal Procedure Re-
forms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 1231, 1293 (2008).
133. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
134. Marceau, supra note 12, at 426-27
135. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bryan v. Mullin, 335
F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).
136. Id.
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dress the substantive, rather than merely procedural, issues that are in-
volved with federal habeas claims.
In sum, federal courts should adopt de novo review to ensure proce-
dural fairness in the habeas corpus process. In Wilson, the Tenth Circuit
captured the three-way split in how federal courts have addressed signifi-
cant constitutional claims involving habeas appeals. 37 For the Tenth
Circuit, the court viewed the habeas claim being brought in Wilson as
lacking the sine qua non of a full and fair evidentiary hearing.1 38 Thus,
when the state court failed to consider the mitigating evidence in reach-
ing its decision, de novo review applied. 39 In the Ninth Circuit, the
court looked at whether the lack of a full fact-finding record resulted in
procedural unfairness. 140 If the reason for this lack of a hearing is not
rebutted by the four factor test of unreasonableness under § 2254(d)(2),
then de novo review is applied.' 41 Yet, the other Federal Circuit courts
seem less concerned with deciding these constitutional procedural issues
because the courts apply § 2254(d) deference to the state court decision,
even when these decisions often times lacked exculpatory evidence.1 42
Many Federal Circuits do not apply de novo review because, in the
courts' opinions, the merits have not changed from the state court deci-
sion to the habeas appeal. However, as has hopefully been made more
apparent from this Comment, this overextended application of § 2254(d)
deference has resulted in significant constitutional violations of proce-
dural due process because many defendants have never received a full
and fair hearing on the merits of their new habeas claims.143 Thus, from
this three-way split, the best way to protect procedural due process is to
adopt the narrow application of de novo review from Wilson.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit recently granted the petition for en banc review
in Wilson to finalize whether the decision to deny an evidentiary hearing
by the state court "warrants deference under § 2254(d)." 144 Wilson has
already provided the most compelling reasons for why de novo review
offers a better solution. Namely, de novo review is the better way to
address habeas appeals that claim that a full and fair evidentiary hearing
was never afforded in state court. If the prerequisite of a full and fair
hearing is not met, then the claim could not have been adjudicated on the
merits, and, thus, § 2254(d) does not apply. Therefore, de novo review
137. Id. at 1082 n.3.
138. Id. at 1079.
139. Id. at 1080.
140. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).
141. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 408 (citing Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000-01).
142. See supra notes 74-82.
143. See Marceau, supra note 12, at 432 (characterizing the lack of a full and fair hearing as
stripping federal evidentiary hearings of their legal effect).
144. Wilson v. Sirnons, 549 F.3d. 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008).
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should be applied. Additionally, Wilson uniquely captured the impor-
tance of de novo review by emphasizing that due process requires a full
and fair hearing to address significant constitutional issues. By straining
to apply § 2254(d) deference, other federal courts might violate proce-
dural due process rights. Thus, there needs to be a return to what Tho-
mas Jefferson famously phrased as the "eternal and unremitting" force of
habeas corpus.1 45 There needs to be de novo review in the federal habeas
appeals process. In short, the Supreme Court should adopt the precedent
already set by the Tenth Circuit in Wilson.
Matthew K. Mulder*
145. See Freedman, supra note 1.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Justin Marceau for his endless help, guidance, and suggestions. I would also like to
thank the editors and staff of the Denver University Law Review for their hard work in improving
this comment, especially Mike Smith, Justin Curry, and Forrest Plesko. Finally, thank you to my
friends and family for their love and support, especially my mother Kay, my father Clem, and my
sisters Kimi and Kacey.
2009] 1197

